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Political Influences on Biotechnology-based Innovation for European Agriculture: 
Risk-Assessment and Risk Management 
 
Michele Mastroeni, James Mittra and Joyce Tait 
 
Abstract 
In this paper we explore how the politics of European regulation and risk governance for 
innovative agricultural biotechnologies, with the continuing emphasis on the precautionary 
principle, has problematised conventional norms of evidence-based risk-related decision-
making. Based on a study we conducted that analysed how the EU regulatory system had 
operated in practice in the context of two of the company Syngenta’s genetically modified 
(GM) crops (Bt11 and GA21), and through stakeholder workshops, we highlight the 
tensions in the current regulatory system in Europe, the implications for the future 
regulation of new and emerging advanced agricultural biotechnologies in the EU, and 
suggest areas where there may be a need for further regulatory adjustment.  
 Introduction 
The politicisation of European regulatory systems for GM crop development, leading to 
the EU becoming largely a GM-free zone, has been commented on widely (Davison and 
Ammann, 2017; Chataway et al, 2006; Tait, 2009). Environmental Risk Assessment 
(ERA) is one of the areas where the process of politicisation can be observed through the 
interactions between the company and the regulator, as reported here based on access to 
relevant documents held by Syngenta plc.  
We define the term ‘risk’ as the combination of the extent of a hazard, and the probability 
of its occurrence. Controlling the risks arising from innovative technologies also has 
societal and political dimensions; inevitably, in a plural democracy, there will be a variety 
of societal perspectives on the acceptability of specific risks and the desirability of related 
benefits. The overall process of risk management (RM) takes these factors into account 
when setting parameters and discussing acceptable levels of risk. As part of RM, risk 
assessment (RA) should be a scientific evaluation of risk that provides good quality 
evidence on which to base the societal and political judgements about risk acceptability 
(Renn 2008). The European regulation of GM crops provides an example where this 
convention has been over-ridden to the extent that scientific evidence is seen by some 
important actors as irrelevant to both RA and RM. 
The case studies and stakeholder workshops we describe in this paper reveal the 
tensions between evidence-based decision-making and value-based stakeholder 
demands, and the consequences of not having a system in place to resolve such 
tensions. These tensions also have implications for the future regulation of new and 
emerging innovative advanced agricultural biotechnologies (AABs) in the EU.  
In this paper we describe the background to the research project and EU regulatory 
developments relevant to GM crops, and then discuss findings from two case studies and 
two workshops in the context of the operation in practice of the EU regulatory system. 
Finally, we consider potential policy solutions to address past and ongoing regulatory 
constraints on GM crop cultivation, and also broader issues around governance of 
advanced agricultural biotechnologies that are being shaped by current regulatory 
approaches.  
Methods 
Two case studies were undertaken for an ESRC/Syngenta Knowledge Exchange project 
conducted in 2013-14, showing the progress of Syngenta’s GM crops (Bt11 and GA21) in 
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their passage through the EU regulatory system. The cases were built on published 
reports, peer-reviewed articles, and access to Syngenta’s regulatory submission 
portfolios. We analysed the responses from member states to the dossiers submitted by 
Syngenta during the regulatory process, focusing specifically on environmental risk 
assessment, and noted the different framings and tenor of the questions asked. We 
categorised these as follows: reference statements suggesting other data thought to be 
relevant to the analysis, of which Syngenta and/or the European Food Safety Authority 
(EFSA) should be aware; negative statements disagreeing with some element of 
Syngenta’s submission; neutral requests for more data or clarification of existing data; and 
direct challenges to the rigour or accuracy of Syngenta’s studies or conclusions. 
In addition to analysis of these documents, we undertook two site visits to Syngenta 
(Jealots Hill), interviewed seven Syngenta personnel and other experts, and held 
meetings with Syngenta scientists and regulatory affairs experts. We also held two one-
day workshops to explore different approaches to stakeholder dialogue on AABs. The 
workshops aimed to take the discussion on GM crops and emerging biotechnologies 
beyond questions of risk and uncertainty to broader issues of sustainable innovation, 
smarter regulation, and food security. The first workshop involved 7 potential users of 
agricultural technologies from the farming community, and science advisory organisations. 
The second workshop involved 18 stakeholders from industry and policy communities. 
Data from the interviews and meetings were recorded and transcribed, preserving 
participant anonymity.  
Background to Risk and the EU Regulatory System 
The concept of a ‘risk assessment-policy gap’ (Evans et al. 2006) was one starting point 
for this analysis in that, for the ERA, there has been no agreement on the operational 
definitions of environmental protection goals, and no clarity on the evidence sufficient to 
satisfy regulators’ requirements (Garcia-Alonso 2013; Raybould and Poppy, 2013). 
According to Evans et al. (2006), RM incorporates a dialogue about societal values and 
preferences, including what is worthy of protection and the degree to which it should be 
protected, whereas RA aims to be objective and to reveal factual truths about the world 
(i.e. RA involves the measurement and delivery of data to help determine the extent to 
which the objectives specified in the RM can be met).  
We suggest that for EU GM crop regulation both RM and RA continue to be strongly 
influenced by value judgements. Without clear guidance on how scientific evidence should 
be used in these decisions, evidence can be interpreted differently to support different 
value positions (Devor et al, 2014). The precautionary principle, which informs European 
regulatory policy, is part of the structural base that contributes to the existence of these 
challenges. According to the EC, “…the precautionary principle can be involved when a 
phenomenon, product or process may have a dangerous effect, identified by scientific and 
objective evaluation if this evaluation does not allow risk to be determined with sufficient 
certainty,” [emphasis added] (European Commission, 2000). The ambiguity around 
“sufficient certainty” means that there is a degree of openness and interpretive flexibility in 
how evidence is used during the process.  
The EU’s incorporation of the precautionary principle throughout its regulatory systems 
has facilitated the introduction of values into RA (Chataway et al 2006) rather than as a 
foundational basis for RM, and this is reinforced by the adoption of a voting mechanism in 
the European Parliament for final approval of GM crops for cultivation in the EU 
(Zetterberg and Bjornberg, 2017), regardless of results from the RA process. Raybould 
and Poppy (2012) argue that the RA policy gap is the main reason why accumulated 
ecological research showing negligible environmental risk of GM crops has failed to 
expedite EU regulatory approvals for these crops. Others note that, with GMOs presumed 
as different from other crop counterparts, problems have arisen from the early, 
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unnecessarily negative framing of citizen preferences (Tait 2001, 2009), facilitated by a 
permissive policy environment with regard to the dissemination of inaccurate scientific 
claims. One example of this is the favourable reception the European Parliament gave to 
misleading claims based on a report that stated that the herbicide glyphosate is a 
carcinogen, but which was widely criticised and retracted by the journal that published it 
(Casassus, 2013).  
Conflicting values from different stakeholder perspectives involve issues that cannot be 
dealt with through scientific evidence on a single issue. Therefore, initial RM discussions 
and the basis for the regulatory system cannot rest on what is “rational scientific evidence” 
alone. If the variety of issues are ignored, and the focus is only on framing things based 
on scientific evidence, then broader value-based issues may became “wedged” into the 
RA process by stakeholders who are left out (Legge and Durant, 2010; Skogstad, 2011; 
Tait, 2001). Table 1 summarizes the different stakeholders and some of their 
positions/biases regarding GMOs. 
 
 Group Position/Bias 
Pr
o 
Ag-Biotech firms  • Access to markets and related profit  
• Seek return on investment on R&D 
• See deterioration of R&D capacity in Europe  
• Science-based assessment is only “rational” assessment that 
should be considered;  
• GMOs are no different than new plants derived from other 
methods (i.e. breeding) 
Smaller Biotech • See GMOs as positive 
• Worry about negative market perception of GMOs and how may 
hurt business 
Scientists  
• See translation of biotech research into usable products as 
positive 
• See GMOs as having low risk based on existing data 
• Some see GMOs as useful, but perhaps not yet able to declare 
completely safe (favour further research and trials). 
European States (i.e. 
UK and Spain) 
• Open to GMOs as contributors to agricultural and economic 
competitiveness. 
Political parties • Liberal parties, generally in favour of GMOs 
US, Canada, 
Argentina, Brazil, 
Egypt, South Africa  
• See GMOs as safe, and regulatory system should treat like any 
other new crop; 
• See EU regulation as unfair to trade; 
Farmers • Intensive arable farmers see GMOs as potentially positive 
• Worry about market perception of GMOs and how may hurt 
business, therefore hesitate on investment 
   
An
ti 
Environmental NGOs • Possibility of gene transfer and unknown environmental 
consequences; 
• Parallels with other disasters (e.g. Bhopal, 3 Mile Island, 
Chernobyl) 
• GMOs lead to corporate control over food production and 
distribution; 
• GMOs lead to intensive farming; 
• Look at past corporate actions re pesticides – not trustworthy 
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European States 
including France, 
Germany, Italy, 
Austria 
• Views range from cultural treatment of food and farming, to 
environmental concerns. 
Political Parties • Green and Socialist parties see increased corporate control of 
farming, and of intensive farming 
Consumer Groups • Increasingly against intensive farming 
Farmers • Organic farmers see GMOs as directly against their values 
Table 1: Positions and Bias amongst stakeholders re GMO, drawing from Herring, 2008; Tait, 
2001; Tosun and Schaub, 2017 
The EU regulatory system 
Regulation of GM crop cultivation in the EU is based on Directive 2001/18/EC, and 
includes an ERA and post-market monitoring (Mittra et al. 2014). An application for 
approval to grow a GM crop is submitted to a national authority (e.g. in the UK the 
Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs); the national authority 
acknowledges receipt within 14 days, and sends the application to EFSA (the lead agency 
in managing the application process). If it includes a request for permission to cultivate, 
EFSA delegates it to a national competent authority (CA). The ERA and the RA on health 
and safety are conducted in parallel over six months, although it may take longer if further 
information is requested from applicants. If a GM crop is approved by EFSA and by EC 
members, cultivation would be permitted throughout the EU. 
The ERA may include data from laboratory-based tests, assessments based on risk 
calculations, and exposure/field studies. It includes a monitoring plan requiring the 
identification of areas of uncertainty or risk that may not be in the “current knowledge and 
the limited scope of the environmental risk assessment” (EFSA, 2006).  
During the risk assessment, the CAs of other EU member states have the opportunity to 
ask further questions or to ask for clarification of specific points in the dossier. Once the 
dossier has been given a positive assessment by EFSA, and a positive ERA opinion by 
the CA, the EC decision is presented to the Standing Committee of the Food Chain and 
Animal Health of Member States, which must vote on the decision within three months. If 
at this stage there is no qualified majority vote in favour of approving the application, the 
decision is passed to the Council of Ministers. If there is still no qualified majority in favour, 
it is passed back to the EC (Mittra et al. 2014). A qualified majority is 55% of member 
states representing 65% of the EU population (EuropaBio, 2013). Member states can 
prolong this process by requesting further information and evidence, and there are further, 
potentially indefinite, delays if there is no qualified majority for or against acceptance by 
the Standing Committee.  
In 2015, political deadlock and delays in approvals prompted a change to EU regulations. 
For GM crops that have been approved for use by the EFSA, member states were 
permitted to opt out of growing them, but only for political or socio-economic reasons - 
they were not allowed to justify such a decision on the basis of scientific evidence (EU, 
2015; Davison and Ammann, 2017). The expectation was that member states would be 
more willing to give EU-level approval for GM crops if they individually had the ability to 
opt-out (EU, 2015; Laaninen, 2015). The legislation was therefore intended to avoid 
deadlock and to enable member states to reflect their varying democratic preferences on 
the cultivation of GM crops (EU 2015; Muhlback and Tosun 2017). However, the deadlock 
has continued (Eriksson et al 2018). 
GM Crop Case Studies  
Our two cases reveal how the EU RA and RM processes have been applied, and illustrate 
how the political and normative standpoints of stakeholders may impact regulatory 
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procedures. Both cases highlight the lack of formal criteria specifying the data necessary 
to satisfy reviewers, and the degree of rigour required to demonstrate sufficient safety and 
minimization of risk. The ambiguity from a lack of formal criteria opens up  opportunities 
for repeated requests for additional information and delays in the approval process.  
Bt11 maize (resistant to Lepidopteran pests and tolerant to glufosinate herbicide) 
The Bt11 dossier was filed by Syngenta with the French authorities in 1996. At that time 
the crop was approved by the US Department of Agriculture, the US Food and Drug 
Administration, and the Canadian Food Inspection Agency, and later that year by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency, Health Canada and the Japanese authorities. It was 
also approved in 1998 for import of food and feed use in the EU under Directive 
90/220/EEC.1  
Despite being positively assessed, the dossier had to be resubmitted a number of times 
because of changes in the EU regulatory system – the formation of a French Biosafety 
Commission in 1998, and the newly formed EFSA in 2002, after Directive 2001/18/EC 
was approved. It was not until 2003 that the French CA accepted Syngenta’s evidence 
and gave a favourable opinion to the EC and Member States. However, the CAs of other 
member states raised objections to Bt11 being approved for cultivation during the 3-month 
consultation period in 2003. Table 1 summarises the 73 questions/statements. 
Table 1: Categorized questions from national authorities – Bt11 (author generated) 
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Austria 5 0 1 3 1 
Belgium 10 1 0 0 9 
Denmark 3 0 0 3 0 
Finland 3 2 0 1 0 
Germany 19 5 1 10 3 
Ireland 1 0 0 1 0 
Italy 14 3 0 7 4 
Spain 1 0 0 1 0 
Sweden 10 1 0 9 0 
Netherlands 3 0 0 3 0 
UK 4 1 0 3 0 
Total 73 13 2 41 17 
 
After addressing questions from member states, EFSA  in 2005 again published its 
opinion on the cultivation of Bt11, reiterating the conclusion of the French CA, accepting 
that the level of scientific uncertainty and potential environmental impacts, surrounding 
Bt11 was low. 
                                               
1 Notification C/GB/96/M4/1 
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A number of further issues were then raised by Member States on Post Marketing 
Environmental Monitoring (PMEM). Despite its earlier positive assessment, EFSA 
requested further improvements and clarification from Syngenta, leading to reiteration of 
the previous positive conclusion. Some Member States did not accept EFSA’s scientific 
opinions and claimed their concerns were not being adequately addressed, and the EC 
requested that EFSA provide further information to ameliorate these concerns.  
In 2007, the EC highlighted areas where it believed there was scientific uncertainty 
around Bt11, and concluded that in light of the precautionary principle Bt11 should not be 
approved for cultivation, contradicting EFSA’s opinion. This decision was influenced by 
the EC Environment Commissioner Stavros Dimas, who had no technical background in 
the area but who took the political stance of achieving the lowest possible GM crop 
residues in seeds. In an attempt to discourage Bt11 cultivation, he clashed with the 
European Federation of Biotechnology over the interpretation of the studies put forward 
by the EC (Abbott & Schiermeier, 2007; Hodgson, 2008). EFSA (2008, 21) reviewed all 
publications and reaffirmed: ‘its previous conclusions on the environmental safety of 
maize Bt11 … expressed on 19 January, 2005, 20 April 2005 and 7 November 2006’. In 
2009, the EC published an updated draft decision on Bt11 agreeing with EFSA’s position 
(D003698/01).  
On February 25, 2009, 13 years after the original submission, the Standing Committee on 
the Food Chain and Animal Health voted on the EC’s proposed adoption of Bt11 for 
cultivation.  
Number of Countries Number of Equivalent Votes How They Voted 
6  91 In favour 
12 127 Against 
7 95 Abstain 
2 32 Did not participate 
Table 2: vote results for Bt11 proposal for cultivation 
With no qualified majority (which would require 255 votes) the EC was not legally bound 
to issue a decision thus creating an indefinite further delay.  
GA21 maize (tolerant to the herbicide glyphosate) 
Following its approval for import into the EU in March 2008, the application for cultivation 
of GA21 maize was sent to EFSA by the United Kingdom CA in July 2008. EFSA decided 
the application was valid in October 2008, “starting the clock” on the evaluation process. 
The ERA was expected to be completed in six months by the CA appointed to carry out 
the assessment, the Ministry of the Environment of the Czech Republic. The CA asked 
EFSA to ‘stop the clock’ three times:  
• 3 February to 21 December 2009 (227 working days);  
• 12 January to 19 October 2010 (202 working days);  
• 26 October 2010 to 29 November 2011 (286 working days) (total 715 working days).  
On 21 July 2010, Syngenta delivered an information package that answered questions on 
non-target organisms, field trials, and surveillance of crops, the areas of inquiry that had 
prompted the “clock stopping”. The CA deemed this sufficient and on 12 October 2010 
restarted the clock and submitted their final report on 20 October.  
The CA disagreed with Syngenta on the main issue in the report, the impact of cultivation, 
and whether the management of glyphosate (an herbicide), and prevention of its over-
use, should be outlined as part of the process for the crop’s approval or as part of the 
herbicide’s (separate) regulatory process. The CA concluded that some of these 
 7 
responsibilities belonged to Syngenta as part of the crop’s approval and requested a fuller 
description of case specific monitoring, improved general monitoring, and design of a 
user-guide for farmers using glyphosate.  
During the review period, member states were able to review the file and 
comment/request further information (Table 2).  
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Austria 25 0 2 5 18 
Belgium 4 2 0 0 2 
Finland 1 0 0 1 0 
Germany 31 3 2 8 18 
Hungary 2 0 0 2 0 
Ireland 2 0 0 2 0 
Italy 1 0 0 1 0 
Norway 6 1 1 3 1 
Spain 2 1 0 0 1 
Sweden 4 2 0 0 2 
Netherlands 2 0 0 1 1 
UK 4 1 0 3 0 
Total 84 10 5 26 43 
Table 2. Categorized questions from national authorities – GA21 (author generated) 
 
Eighty-four questions/statements were submitted by member states over the evaluation 
period. Interestingly, 43 directly questioned the rigour or accuracy of Syngenta’s studies 
or of its conclusions. Questions challenging the rigour of Syngenta’s studies came mainly 
from Austria and Germany (18 each), both with long-standing normative opposition to GM 
crop development (Mittra et al. 2014). Given countries like Austria and Germany’s 
traditional opposition to GM crops (e.g. both have had a ban on GMO cultivation through 
“safeguard clauses” for a number of years (Butler, 2010), it is understandable that some 
participants in the regulatory process perceived there to be bias in these responses. 
Each question posed by a Member State must be addressed by EFSA, and many of its 
responses pushed back against some of the challenges to the scientific data, although 
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EFSA did in some instances ask applicants to submit additional data. EFSA’s responses 
ranged from asking for all the available data in terms of specific studies already 
conducted, to recognising that previous approval had occurred and that citing a previous 
study was sufficient. EFSA seemed to be attempting to anchor discussion to the scientific 
evidence, and remain politically neutral despite, as noted above, the lack of criteria 
specifying what was necessary to demonstrate safety or the absence of harm. Generally, 
EFSA accepted the hypotheses that Syngenta put forward but also presented the 
strongest concerns by member states in the final report.  
EFSA gave a positive assessment and recommendation that GA21 is as safe as its 
natural counterpart, with the caveat that pesticide use should be monitored (EFSA, 2011). 
However, we could find no record of a vote on its use for cultivation 9 years after the initial 
submission.  
 Workshops – the Future for AABs 
In addition to the case studies, we undertook two stakeholder workshops, as described 
earlier. These brought different stakeholders together to discuss and reflect on current 
and future GMO regulations and their impact on the development and use of new and 
emerging agricultural technologies such as synthetic biology and gene editing. Synthetic 
biology is defined by the EU as ‘The application of science, technology and engineering to 
facilitate and accelerate the design, manufacture and/or modification of genetic materials 
in living organisms’ and gene editing as ‘a process in which DNA is inserted, deleted or 
replaced in the genome of an organisms using nucleases or ‘molecular scissors’, resulting 
in targeted mutations (‘edits’)’ (Tait 2016).  
The Impact of Past Regulatory Experience on Current Framings 
Workshop participants noted what they considered to be the negativity of the early 
debates on GM crops, with little regard for the validity of scientific evidence, and the use 
of emotive terms like ‘Frankenfood’ that coloured the public debate. The influence of such 
language prompted one workshop participant to state that “bio is a trashed brand”. This 
raised the question of whether innovative agricultural biotechnologies like synthetic 
biology and gene editing could also be tainted by this past association. Workshop 
participants were unsure, and their accounts drew upon notions of ‘naturalness’.  
There's … a public sense around GM, around this whole concept of naturalness 
and going with nature, despite the fact that no plant breeding is totally going with 
nature. But the idea that something that tends to import a gene from another plant 
or another completely different species is problematic … Whereas tinkering with 
the existing genetic structure, which some of these newer techniques … will be 
able to do very precisely, actually may not face those sorts of almost philosophical 
barriers. 
In discussing synthetic biology, workshop participants noted the current on-going 
discussion in policy and scientific circles about whether or not such technologies fall under 
the GMO definition, or whether they should be categorised differently. The argument for 
AABs not being labelled as GMO is that they are simply more efficient ways of achieving 
results that could otherwise occur in nature; the counter view among participants was that 
they still involve genetic modification, even where similar results may be achieved through 
breeding. The ‘naturalness’ distinction acquires salience in this context for a particular set 
of stakeholders, and new technologies are valued, or not, through this prism.  
Purposive Change in the Discourse – Benefits and Transparency 
The concern expressed by workshop participants for AABs is that, regardless of different 
risk profiles and new possibilities they may provide, their progress through the system 
may be prevented by existing regulatory structures and the norms they have established. 
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They may be perceived simply as a variant of a GMO, and carry with that the negative 
connotations already documented in the regulatory system. 
Once you tighten regulations, it's very difficult to loosen them again.  And the 
danger is that more and more new technologies just get slipped in under that 
umbrella… And I think there's a very real danger that we will end up in this, sort of, 
economic backwater. 
Workshop participants considered how to shift the discourse away from risk in order to 
avoid new biotechnologies becoming trapped in a negative cycle of perception that would 
affect future regulatory decisions in Europe. Their view was that public engagement 
should focus more on potential benefits of the technology and the lost opportunities that 
result from a precautionary approach to  hazard and risk. In one workshop it was 
suggested that the focus from the start should be on the problems that developers and 
users of the technology are trying to solve, rather than focusing on the technology as if it it 
can be delineated from this problem context. As some participants reflected, they would 
want to focus on communicating the benefits of a technology, but not hide the fact that the 
technology may incorporate biotechnology and may involve some risk. The view was that 
transparency was necessary, but: 
You can't get away from the fact that actually this is a bio based system… that 
you're using to give these great benefits.  Otherwise, people will turn around and 
say: “why can't you do it some other way?” And you can then say: “we can't, we 
can only do it this way. So we're proud of it, it's doing great things, we've looked at 
all the risks and we've got regulation surrounding it and we'd like you to reflect on 
this and consider these benefits.” 
However, some advocacy groups have already begun to steer public discussion towards 
threats and possible risks and these values-based arguments may come to dominate 
broader public discourse, reflecting a pattern noted in the early regulation of GMOs (Tait, 
2001).  
Despite fears of overly tight regulation and negative views of technologies based on 
normative rather than evidence-based starting points, the workshop participants did want 
checks and balances, arguing that it is a benefit to have an independent third party to 
validate the findings around safety of their product. The tendency they wanted to avoid, 
however, was for a regulatory system that becomes a system of “box ticking”, as well as 
trying to cover every eventuality. This would lead, in the view of the workshop participants, 
to overly tight regulation with little flexibility. Some of the workshop participants saw this 
tendency to focus on risk and hazard as being a difficult, yet typical challenge.  
I think that's where we've gone badly wrong in the past because we've been over 
precautionary, insufficiently realistic, [with] insufficient balancing of the actual 
potential of certain risks and hazards to occur versus others.  I don't have any 
confidence in our ability not to focus on some extremely unlikely hazard that will 
probably never happen and to miss something major that we should actually be 
thinking about. 
This concern of being overly cautious and focused on hazards was also linked to 
perceptions that anti-GMO values are often the starting point, which were also viewed by 
workshop participants as anti-science, anti-innovation and anti-profit for large businesses. 
This same view was also expressed by Davison and Ammann (2017) in their description 
of the EU’s regulatory system for GMOs and its possible impact on new technologies.  
Some of the caution, as argued by NGO representatives in our workshops, however, 
comes from their assessing new technologies or crop products based on current farming 
practices and uses. There was a hesitation expressed in terms of accepting that farming 
practices would necessarily change with a new product. While they have more hesitation 
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with some technologies such as GM, it would be helpful to see how a new technology was 
situated within whole farming practice, rather than treating it as a separate technology. 
From a farmer’s perspective, a workshop participant stated that they naturally look at 
sustainability, “I know I will lose the land if I do something that's going to [cause] damage 
and we want to try and improve it. So that's the actual easy bit, looking at the 
environmental and the economical and the technical.”  Overall, the grounded experience 
and expertise of the different practitioner stakeholders were seen as necessary to 
consider; one challenge in this regard, however, was how to assess different voices’ 
expertise in a broader forum: “I think one of the worst things about the internet is that 
everybody's opinion is equal. And yet somebody's got 30 years' experience compared to 
somebody who writes a blog, the same weight is given.”  
Discussion and Conclusions 
Bias perceived in the current EU regulatory system 
Both the cases and the workshops provided insights into the challenges facing those 
participating in the current regulatory structures in the EU, as well as the challenges that 
will likely become evident as new technologies emerge. Specifically, the case studies 
illustrated that regulation of GM crops in the EU was unable to avoid the intrusion of 
delaying tactics that were interpreted as ideology-based into the scientific evaluation 
process of RA; and these delaying tactics were facilitated by the absence of clear criteria, 
standards and end-points defining the evidence needed to justify approval of a GM crop. 
In regards to the latter, we noted disagreement amongst CAs and EFSA regarding what is 
sufficient or rigorous evidence. EFSA was faced with trying to maintain scientific rigour 
while also navigating member state challenges about the nature and meaning of data, and 
politically influenced requests for clarification or further studies. In addition, grey literature 
highlighted cancellations of meetings, which extended the time period of a crop candidate 
moving through the regulatory process, and the EC’s refusal to make a decision in the 
event of no qualified majority. EuropaBio noted that the Commission has formally 
admitted that it regularly fails to comply with legal timelines when it comes to GM 
authorizations (2013, pg. 1). 
Davison and Ammann (2017), in their discussion of EU GMO regulation highlight that EC 
votes on GMO crop decisions after they pass through EFSA tend to align with member 
states’ political stances on GMOs, rather than any evidence presented. They also note, 
amongst other things: EFSA being criticized, or its recommendations ignored by the 
European Commission and Parliament, despite the scientific evidence; and legislation 
presented by the EU leadership which is openly anti-GM on an ideological basis. Eriksson 
(2018), in a similar vein, notes that the initial intent of EU regulation around GMOs was 
that it would adapt as more evidence of their safety became available. With over three 
decades of evidence of safe use accumulated internationally, Eriksson implies a wilful 
disregard of evidence for political and/or value-based reasons.  
GMO regulation and its impact on new technologies 
Scientists are concerned that the EU regulatory systems may lead to delays or the 
prevention new technologies developing, such as AABs. Defining them as GMOs would 
enable their capture by GM regulation, and the EU has held open this possibility in the 
reports of the Scientific Committee on Emerging and Newly Identified Health Risks 
(SCENIHR) (Tait 2016, p31-33). However, these products remain in a state of regulatory 
limbo, to the frustration of those who see the EU as falling behind the rest of the world in 
commercialising scientific research.  
For example, and discussed to some extent in the workshops, different national European 
governments are taking contrasting views on gene editing technologies based on whether 
new or ‘foreign’ DNA is introduced into the plant. According to the Dutch, German and 
Swedish responsible organizations, no new DNA means the technology should not be 
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regulated as GM because the same results could be achieved through normal breeding 
techniques, albeit at a very low probability level (Laaninen, 2016). Others view gene 
editing as falling under the definition of a GM crop because it involves purposeful changes 
in genetic structures, regardless of whether they could occur in nature. In the case of 
synthetic biology where novel DNA can be introduced into the plant genome, it will be 
more difficult to make a case that this is different in a regulatory sense from the preceding 
generation of GM technologies. While developers of these technologies hope to achieve a 
regulatory system that is more proportionate to the properties of the final product, organic 
lobbyists and NGOs favour regulatory categorization as GM crops because of the risk 
they perceive “to the environment and human health” (quotation from Beyond-GM, an 
NGO website). 
Tait et al (2017) have identified a general problem in that the initial choice of regulatory 
system for an innovative biotechnology often proves impossible to adapt later when it is 
found to have a disproportionate impact on commercialisation of the product. Davison and 
Ammann (2017) also argue that the current regulatory system is incapable of properly 
accommodating new AABs, as they are quite different from the GM technologies the 
regulation was created to address.  
The contrasting positions on such issues go beyond different interpretations of data or 
disagreement based on interests; they involve a perception of bias in others and a low 
level of trust amongst stakeholders in GM-related debates. Earlier issues with pesticide 
regulation and slow recall of harmful products, and mismanagement of communication 
around “mad cow” disease, led to distrust of corporate and government sharing and 
interpretation of scientific information (Tait, 2001; Herring, 2008). This is reflected in the 
examples in the grey literature, and in interviews/workshops, where groups holding 
differing normative positions may not accept the evidence from those with whom they 
disagree. How does a regulatory process allow for evidence to be presented and used in 
decision-making in a way that would avoid compromising its quality, increase 
transparency, while still democratically addressing the normative positions of 
organizations and citizens?  
A proposed approach to policy and regulatory structuring 
The approach to regulatory policy we propose here builds on the case studies and the 
workshop discussions. From this basis, three points could usefully be addressed for any 
agricultural biotechnology, existing or new: 
• Equal consideration of benefits and hazards in policy and regulatory discussions, 
avoiding unnecessary negative societal framing of an innovation. 
• More adaptive regulatory systems to accommodate new technologies or new 
evidence regarding current technologies, to support the delivery of societal 
benefits while continuing to ensure safety, quality and efficacy. 
• Greater transparency on the values and incentive structures underlying the 
contributions of all stakeholders involved in regulatory discussions and decisions.  
Relevant to these discussions is the proposed framework Proportionate and Adaptive 
Governance of Innovative Technologies (PAGIT) (Tait et al, 2017), combining the EU 
innovation principle – where the impact of political/policy/regulatory decisions on 
innovation are fully assessed – and the related principles of proportionality and adaptation 
in the delivery of regulatory requirements. PAGIT proposes a more creative use of 
standards and guidelines throughout regulatory processes to continue to ensure safety, 
quality and efficacy of new technologies. The overall aim is to enable societally beneficial 
innovations to be developed within a manageable time-scale and at an affordable cost, 
particularly for small and medium sized companies, while taking account of “the 
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synergistic or competing requirements of innovators, regulators, policymakers and 
stakeholders”. 
Our workshop participants noted the challenges that issues of trust and perception create 
for stakeholder engagement, the interpretation of evidence, and perception of bias in 
others. This concern is shared by Davison and Ammann (2017) in terms of policymakers, 
and (for example) their biases against GM. Further, the range of positions and biases held 
by the different stakeholders noted earlier (Table 1), and the lack of trust in corporate and 
government evidence by citizens, means that continuing calls for transparency throughout 
the regulatory process need to be addressed (Tait, 2001; Skogstad, 2011; Legge and 
Durant, 2010). These issues related to bias and the possibility of value conflicts, from the 
agenda and discourse setting stage to the more operational levels of RM and RA, have 
raised still-unresolved questions for the effective conduct of stakeholder engagement and 
dialogue, despite very considerable investment in EU Horizon 2020 and Framework 
programmes (Tait 2017). 
The EU Transparency Register may contribute to resolving such issues. It is a database 
listing organizations that try to influence EU lawmakers and institutions(including NGOs), 
and requires disclosure of what interests are being pursued, by whom and with what 
budgets (https://ec.europa.eu/info/about-european-commission/service-standards-and-
principles/transparency/transparency-register_en). Adding sources of income and 
requesting evidence requirements would fit in well with the information regarding the 
organizations’ leadership, amount of funds used to lobby the respective EU institutions, 
and how many FTE equivalents are used. At the very least, a stronger culture of 
transparency and quality of evidence may to be established.  
In conclusion, in this paper we have presented our analysis of the politicisation of the 
current European regulatory system for GM crops, and considered its implications for 
future innovative biotechnologies. We have suggested two initiatives that could begin to 
address these challenges, the PAGIT framework and a transparency register but these 
are far from being complete answers. There is a need for further research and analysis on 
how to regulate future innovative technologies and how to enable the productive and 
effective stakeholder dialogue and engagement that will be needed to deliver societal 
acceptance of these technologies.  
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